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In this letter we discuss the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market for Eu-
ropean, Indian and US CDS entities during the financial crisis starting
in 2007 using empirical First Significant Digit (FSD) distributions. We
find out that on a time aggregated level the European and the US market
obey empirical FSD distributions similar to the theoretical ones. Surpris-
ing differences are observed in the development of the FSD distributions
between the US and the European market. While the FSD distribution
of the US derivative market behaves nearly constant during the last fi-
nancial crisis, we find huge fluctuations in the FSD distributions in the
European market. One reason for these differences might be the pos-
sibility of a strategic default for US companies due to Chapter 11 and
avoided contagion effects.
I Introduction
The financial markets and the world economy as a
whole are currently beset by hugh uncertainty.What
was sparked by a decrease of housing prices in the
US, led in the end to a near collapse of the global
credit markets. In this letter we use empirical FSD1
and theoretical Benford-like distributions (Benford,
1938; Grendar et al., 2007) to study the CDS mar-
ket during the financial crisis, which started in
July 2007. The reasons to choose the CDS market
as a representative of the credit market are twofold:
Firstly, before the crisis the CDS market was often
lauded as an over-the-counter (OTC) market with
prodigious risk-transferring ability which stabilizes
the financial system as a whole (Greenspan, 2005).
Secondly, from being a fledgling market in the mid
nineties, the CDS market has grown tremendously
over the last decade (Dechert LLP, 2008), and is
apparent an integral part of the financial system.
The main findings in this work are twofold:
Firstly, we illustrate the usefulness of FSD distri-
butions to check the “quality” of such data “in some
vague sense”(Varian et al., 1972; George and Laura,
2009). Especially for the CDS market this is essen-
1In the following we refer to empirical FSD distributions simply as FSD distributions.
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tial because it is a decentralized OTC market and is
often pictured as an opaque market with little infor-
mation about the pricing mechanism, price setters
and traded volumes. We find out that for Europe
and the US, the first digits follow patterns of FSD
distributions similar to the proposed Benford-like
FSD distribution, i.e., the appearance of the first
digits follow a weakly monotonic decreasing pat-
tern, as provided by Benford (1938); Grendar et al.
(2007). For the Indian market, we observe FSD
distributions which strongly deviate from the theo-
retical one. This might be a hint of “distorted data”
(George and Laura, 2009).
Secondly, provided with daily data, we are in-
terested in the development of the FSD distribu-
tions during the financial crisis 2007. Here we find
huge differences between the FSD distribution of US
companies and European ones. Quite surprisingly,
for US companies the FSD distribution of the CDS
spreads remained nearly stable during the financial
crisis. This poses the question why the CDS market
of this region – which was the origin of the financial
crisis – is in terms of FSD distributions more stable
than the European market.
This article is organized as follows: The next
section briefly reviews the literature on FSD distri-
butions and the CDS market. Then we will describe
our data. Thereafter we present the main results
of this letter. Finally conclusions and discussions
about further research follow.
II Benford’s Law, Benford-
like Distributions and the
CDS Market
Benford’s Law (Benford, 1938) is an unexpected
mathematical relationship that states that the
FSDs of numerous examples of data follow a spe-
cific distribution and are not uniformly distributed
as one could expect. It postulates that the prob-
ability that the first digit is i ∈ {1 . . . 9} is given
by p(i) = log10(1 + 1/i). E.g., the 1 appears with
about 30.1% and the 9 only with 4.6% as the first
digit. Nearly 60 years later, Hill (1995) provides a
rigorous proof of this law as well as conditions un-
der which it holds. Today there is a wide range of
data sets which have been tested according to Ben-
ford’s Law, e.g., Giles (2007); Depken (2008); Gu¨n-
nel and To¨dter (2009) or Ley (1996). Ley (1996)
for example finds that 1-day returns of the S&P 500
reasonably agree with Benford’s Law. Huge devia-
tions from it are often interpreted as signals of some
type of irregularity like psychological price barri-
ers or price collusions (Ceuster et al., 1998; Giles,
2007). But the literature also shares the common
result that we rarely find a perfect match of the ob-
served FSDs to Benford’s Law2. Therefore Grendar
et al. (2007) propose an information theoretic ap-
proach, based on the first moments of the empirical
FSDs, to derive modifications of the Benford dis-
tribution – Benford-like distributions. The idea of
the approach proposed by Grendar et al. (2007) is
to estimate a probability distribution P which min-
imizes the Kullback-Leibler distance to the Benford
distribution and has a first moment which equals
the empirical FSD mean. Distributions for differ-
ent first moments of FSDs are tabulated in Gren-
dar et al. (2007). The resulting Benford-like dis-
tribution P provide a null distribution for testing
empirical FSD distributions.
There is a broad literature analyzing the CDS
market, e.g., Forte and Pen˜a (2009); Longstaff et al.
(2005); Realdon (2008). Jorion and Zhang (2007)
study contagion effects in the CDS market due to
Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 events.
Building up on the work of Ley (1996), who
studied the stock market using Benford’s Law and
on Realdon (2008), who linked the CDS market to
the stock market, we study the CDS market using
FSD and Benford-like distributions.
III Data
As a basis to illustrate the distribution of the FSDs
and to check the appropriateness of FSD distribu-
tions to study the OTC market, we use daily Markit
CDS data for European, Indian and US companies.
Markit is one of the leading data provider which
is spezialized on pricing credit derivatives. Accord-
ing to Markit the CDS spreads do not represent
the actual traded spreads but each contributor to
2As noted by Scott and Fasli (2001) only about one half of Benford’s original data sets provide reasonable close fit to
the Benford distribution.
2
Markit provides the data from its books of record
and/or automated trading systems. The offered
Markit CDS spreads are composites of these dif-
ferent sources (Markit Group Limited, 2008). In
this work we use daily CDS spreads in basis points
(bpts.) for European, Indian as well as US compa-
nies which are on the run from 2006-08 to 2010-02.
We are provided with spreads for 11 different ma-
turities ranging from 6 months to 30 years.
In addition to the basic CDS contract terms
such as maturity, sector & issuer, CDS contracts of-
ten come in four different flavors according to their
restructuring mechanism (no restructuring, full re-
structuring, modified restructuring, or modified-
modified restructuring). The Markit data set con-
tains CDS spreads in all four different restructuring
versions. For studying FSD distributions we did
not exclude any of these restructuring mechanisms.
Our time series runs for 868 days, which results in a
total of ∼ 1.44× 108 CDS spread observations. For
the different regions, we observe on average daily
78, 289 observations for European companies, 1, 054
for Indian and 88, 346 for US ones. Table 1 summa-
rizes some descriptive statistics of the CDS spreads
for the two largest markets – the European and the
US market. It contains the observed means, medi-
ans and standard deviations for the considered time
series. We split the data into two categories, invest-
ment CDS entities and subinvestment CDS entities.
The first group contains entities with a credit rat-
ing3 of at least A and the second group contains all
CDS entities which are rated worse than A.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of CDS spreads in the sample
Investment Subinvestment
Europe US Europe US
Mean CDS spread (basis points) 79.778 83.095 166.647 227.563
Median CDS spread 66.976 57.456 118.701 146.479
Standard Deviation of CDS spreads 49.598 73.086 144.491 226.026
IV Results
Reasonability of the data: In order to check
the quality of our data, we use the approach pro-
posed by Grendar et al. (2007). Fig. 1 presents
rootograms for the aggregated daily FSD distribu-
tions of the US (left), the European (middle) and
the Indian (right) CDS entities. The observed pro-
portions are displayed as bars, “hanging” on the es-
timated Benford-like distributions P which are cal-
culated on the basis of the observed FSD means for
the different regions.
As we can see for the first two markets the FSD
distributions are very similar to the theoretical ones.
For the Indian market we observe much more higher
digits (6 to 9) than predicted by the estimated dis-
tribution. Along the lines of George and Laura
(2009) this might be an indication of distorted data.
For all three markets, statistical tests like a χ2-
test or Kuiper test would reject the null-hypothesis
because of the huge power that any of these tests
have given the large sample size. If one takes mod-
els as approximations to reality, instead of perfect
data reproducers, this can be seen as a weakness of
Neyman Pearson statistics (Ley, 1996). For sample
sizes N less than 5000 observations we would reject
the null only for the Indian market at a significance
level of 1%. Table 2 summarizes the Kuiper’s basic
test statistics V (Giles, 2007), which is the sum of
the maximum distance above and below the esti-
mated reference distribution.
3The average of the Moody’s and S&P ratings, provided by Markit
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Fig. 1: Time aggregated rootograms for the US, European and Indian CDS market. The
FSD means d¯ are 3.6 for the US, 3.66 for Europe and 3.18 for India.
Table 2: Kuiper test results.
US Europe India
sample size N 76684486 67954791 915207
Kuiper V 0.02462 0.02726 0.10343
Empirical FSD development through the cri-
sis: As we are interested in the development of the
empirical FSD distributions during the financial cri-
sis Fig. 2 displays the FSD of US (top) and Euro-
pean (bottom) CDS spreads. Due to the huge devi-
ations of the Indian CDS market from its estimated
Benford-like distribution, this market is disregarded
in further examinations.
The vertical lines in the graphs indicate key
events in the financial crisis 2007. The first ver-
tical line denotes the start of the crisis – July 17,
2007 – when Bear Stearns disclosed that two of its
subprime hedge funds had lost nearly all of their
value. The second line – March 16, 2008 – indicates
the Fire Sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan and the
last line indicates the collapse of Lehman Brothers
(September 15, 2008). Fig. 2 shows that the FSD
distribution for the US CDS market remains nearly
constant. The lines in the graphs denote the em-
pirical proportions of the single digits. From top to
down, the first line stands for digit 1, i.e., at the
beginning of our time series, 1 appeared as the first
digit with 0.247 for European CDS spreads and with
0.257 for US CDS spreads. For digit 2 we observe
at the first observation date 0.177 and 0.175 for the
European and US markets, respectively. For digit 9
0.037, and 0.042 is observed. If the beginning of the
subprime crisis was the default of two Bear Stearns
Hedge Funds, we see from Fig. 2 that before the
crisis the American as well the European market
behave very similar. But from the beginning of the
crisis, both markets develop completely different in
terms of FSD distributions. While the US market
remained more or less stable (the standard devia-
tion for the 1 as a leading digit during the whole
time period is only 0.02), we observe for the Euro-
pean market for digit 1 a standard deviation which
is more than double, namely 0.05.
A well known difference between the US and Eu-
ropean CDS market is their composition in terms
of credit quality. The US CDS market is broader
in the sense of credit quality, i.e, we observe more
bad credit quality CDS entities. To eliminate such
an effect we split our data into “investments” and
“subinvestments”. The first group contains only en-
tities with an average credit rating quality of at least
A, while the second group contains all non-default
entities below A, i.e., from BBB to CCC/C. The
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Fig. 2: FSD of the CDS spreads of US and European Companies. From top to down, the
lines indicate the frequencies of the leading digits in increasing order, i.e. from 1 to 9.
results for these two groups are illustrated in Fig. 3.
As we can see in both groups – investment and
subinvestment companies – the FSD distribution for
US entities is more stable. The higher FSD fluctua-
tion of the investment grade CDS market is caused
by the fact that spreads are more concentrated at
the lower end of the spread scale. I.e., we observe
mainly spreads below 100bpts. Therefore a change
of the credit spreads is more likely to come along
with a change in the FSD, than for spreads above
e.g., 100bpts. But as we can see from Figure 3 split-
ting the data into an investment and a subinvest-
ment grade does not eliminate the regional differ-
ences in the FSD distributions.
V Conclusions and Discus-
sions
In this letter we studied Benford-like distributions
for the CDS market during the last financial crisis.
First of all we illustrated the usefulness of such dis-
tributions to study data quality of the CDS market.
We find out that for the Indian CDS market the
observed CDS spreads do not follow the expected
Benford-like distribution. Following the literature
(Varian et al., 1972; George and Laura, 2009) this
could be a hint for “low” data quality. For the US
and European market the data are in accordance
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Fig. 3: FSD of the investment and subinvestment grade CDS spreads.
with the patterns of the corresponding Benford-like
distributions. In studying the behaviour of the FSD
distributions during the financial crisis 2007, we find
huge fluctuations of the FSD for the European mar-
ket, while the US market remains more or less con-
stant. One possible reason could be that the Euro-
pean market was confronted with herding behaviour
during the crisis (Devenow and Welch, 1996). Due
to the increasing market uncertainty, market par-
ticipants start to imitate and adopt the observed
CDS prices. The missing of herding in the US mar-
ket may be traced back to the Bankruptcy Code
for US companies. Due to the Chapter 11 clause,
firms “always” have the possibility of a strategic de-
fault. Jorion and Zhang (2007) discuss contagion
effects and the US bankruptcy clauses, which sets
the scene for further research that e.g., investigates
contagion effects in the financial markets via FSD
distributions.
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